We investigate the direct-sum problem in the context of differentially private PAC learning: What is the sample complexity of solving k learning tasks simultaneously under differential privacy, and how does this cost compare to that of solving k learning tasks without privacy? In our setting, an individual example consists of a domain element x labeled by k unknown concepts (c1, . . . , c k ). The goal of a multi-learner is to output k hypotheses (h1, . . . , h k ) that generalize the input examples.
INTRODUCTION
The work on differential privacy [14] is aimed at providing useful analyses on privacy-sensitive data while providing strong individual-level privacy protection. One family of such analyses that has received a lot of attention is PAC learning [28] . These tasks abstract many of the computations performed over sensitive information [22] .
We address the direct-sum problem -what is the cost of solving multiple instances of a computational task simultaneously as compared to solving each of them separately?in the context of differentially private PAC learning. In our setting, individual examples are drawn from domain X and labeled by k unknown concepts (c1, . . . , c k ) taken from a concept class C = {c : X → {0, 1}}, i.e., each example is of the form (x, y1, . . . , y k ), where x ∈ X and yi = ci(x). The goal of a multi-learner is to output k hypotheses (h1, . . . , h k ) that generalize the input examples while preserving the privacy of individuals.
The direct-sum problem has its roots in complexity theory, and is a basic problem for many algorithmic tasks. It also has implications for the practical use of differential privacy. Consider, for instance, a hospital that collects information about its patients and wishes to use this information for medical research. The hospital records for each patient a collection of attributes such as age, sex, and the results of various diagnostic tests (for each patient, these attributes make up a point x in some domain X) and, for each of k diseases, whether the patient suffers from the disease (the k labels (y1, . . . , y k )). Based on this collection of data, the hospital researchers wish to learn good predictors for the k diseases. One option for the researchers is to perform each of the learning tasks on a fresh sample of patients, hence enlarging the number of patient examples needed (i.e. the sample complexity) by a factor of k, which can be very costly.
Without concern for privacy, the sample complexity that is necessary and sufficient for performing the k learning tasks is actually fully characterized by the VC dimension of the concept class C -it is independent of the number of learning tasks k. In this work, we set out to examine if the situation is similar when the learning is performed with differential privacy. Interestingly, we see that with differential privacy the picture is quite different, and in particular, the required number of examples can grow polynomially in k.
Private learning.
A private learner is an algorithm that is given an sample of labeled examples (x, c(x)) (each representing the infor-mation and label pertaining to an individual) and outputs a generalizing hypothesis h that guarantees differential privacy with respect to its examples. The first differentially private learning algorithms were given by Blum et al. [7] and the notion of private learning was put forward and formally researched by Kasiviswanathan et al. [22] . Among other results, the latter work presented a generic construction of differentially private learners with sample complexity O(log |C|).
In contrast, the sample complexity of (non-private) PAC learning is Θ(VC(C)), which can be much lower than log |C| for specific concept classes. This gap led to a line of work examining the sample complexity of private learning, which has revealed a significantly more complex picture than there is for non-private learning. In particular, for pure differentially private learners, it is known that the sample complexity of proper learning (where the learner returns a hypothesis h taken from C) is sometimes higher than the sample complexity of improper learners (where h comes from an arbitrary hypothesis class H). The latter is characterized by the representation dimension of the concept class C, which is generally higher than the VC dimension [3, 2, 12, 4, 18] . By contrast, a sample complexity gap between proper and improper learners does not exist for non-private learning. In the case of approximate differential privacy no such combinatorial characterization is currently known. It is however known that the sample complexity of such learners can be significantly lower than that of pure-differentially private learners and yet higher than the VC dimension of C (for proper learning) [4, 18, 10] . Furthermore, there exist (infinite) PAC-learnable concept classes for which no differentially private proper-learner (pure or approximate) exists.
Private multi-learning.
In this work we examine the sample complexity of private multi-learning. Our work is motivated by the recurring research theme of the direct-sum, as well as by the need to understand whether multi-learning remains feasible under differential privacy, as it is without privacy constraints.
At first glance, private multi-learning appears to be similar to the query release problem, the goal of which is to approximate the average values of a large collection of predicates on a dataset. One surprising result in differential privacy is that it is possible to answer an exponential number of such queries on a dataset [8, 25, 20] . For example, Blum, Ligett, and Roth [8] showed that given a dataset D and a concept class C, it is possible to generate with differential privacy a datasetD such that the average value of c onD approximates the average of c on D for every c ∈ C simultaneously. The sample complexity required, i.e., the size of the database D, to perform this sanitization is only logarithmic in |C|. Results of this flavor suggest that we can also learn exponentially many concepts simultaneously. However, we give negative results showing that this is not the case, and that multi-learning can have significantly higher sample complexity than query release.
Our results
Prior work on privately learning the simple concept classes POINTX (of functions that evaluate to 1 on exactly one point of their domain X and to 0 otherwise) and THRESHX (of functions that evaluate to 1 on a prefix of the domain X and to 0 otherwise) has demonstrated a rather complex pic-ture, depending on whether learners are proper or improper, and whether learning is performed with pure or approximate differential privacy [3, 2, 4, 5, 10] . We analyze the sample complexity of multi-learning of these simple concept classes, as well as general concept classes. We also consider the class PAR d of parity functions, but in this case we restrict our attention to uniformly selected examples. We examine both proper and improper PAC and agnostic learning under pure and approximate differential privacy. For ease of reference, we include tables with our results in Appendix A, where we omit the dependency on the privacy and accuracy parameters. Techniques for private k-learning. Composition theorems for differential privacy show that the sample complexity of learning k concepts simultaneously is at most a factor of k larger than the sample complexity of learning one concept (and may be reduced to √ k for approximate differential privacy). Unfortunately, privately learning one concept from a concept class C can sometimes be quite costly, requiring much higher sample complexity than VC(C) which is needed to learn non-privately. Building on techniques of Beimel, Nissim, and Stemmer [6] , we show that the multiplicative dependence on k can always be reduced to the VC-dimension of C, at the expense of producing a one-time sanitization of the dataset. Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Let C be a concept class for which there is pure differentially private sanitizer for C ⊕ = {f ⊕ g : f, g ∈ C} with sample complexity m. Then there is an pure differentially private agnostic k-learner for C with sample complexity O(m + k · VC(C)).
Similarly, if C ⊕ has an approximate differentially private sanitizer with sample complexity m, then there is an approximate differentially private agnostic k-learner for C with sample complexity O(m + √ k · VC(C)).
The best known general-purpose sanitizers require sample complexity m = O(VC(C) log |X|) for pure differential privacy [8] and m = O(log |C| log |X|) for approximate differential privacy [20] . However, for specific concept classes (such as POINTX and THRESHX ), the sample complexity of sanitization can be much lower.
In the case of approximate differential privacy, the sample complexity of k-learning can be even lower than what is achievable with our generic learner. Using stability-based arguments, we show that point functions and parities under the uniform distribution can be PAC k-learned with sample complexity O(VC(C)) -independent of the number of concepts k (see Theorems 3.9 and 3.8). Lower bounds. In light of the above results, one might hope to be able to reduce the dependence on k further, or to eliminate it entirely (as is possible in the case of non-private learning). We show that this is not possible, even for the simplest of concept classes. In the case of pure differential privacy, a packing argument [17, 21, 3] shows that any non-trivial concept class requires sample complexity Ω(k) to privately k-learn (Theorem 5.1). For approximate differential privacy, we use fingerprinting codes [9, 11] to show that unlike points and parities, threshold functions require sample complexityΩ(k 1/3 ) to PAC learn privately (Corollary 4.5). Moreover, any non-trivial concept class requires sample complexityΩ( √ k) to privately learn in the agnostic model (Theorem 4.6). In the case of point functions, this matches the upper bound achievable by our generic learner.
We highlight a few of the main takeaways from our results:
A complex answer to the direct sum question. Our upper bounds show that solving k learning problems simultaneously can require substantially lower sample complexity than solving the problems individually. On the other hand, our lower bounds show that a significant dependence on k is generally necessary.
Separation between private PAC and private agnostic learning. Non-privately, the sample complexities of PAC and agnostic learning are of the same order (differing only in the dependency in the accuracy parameters). Beimel et al. [6] showed that this is also the case with differentially private learning (of one concept). Our results on learning point functions show that private PAC and agnostic multi-learning can be substantially different (even for learning up to constant error). In the case of approximate differential privacy, O(1) sample suffice to PAC-learn multiple point functions. However,Ω( √ k) samples are needed to learn k points agnostically.
Separation between improper learning with approximate differential privacy and non-private learning.
Recently, Bun et al. [10] showed that the sample complexity of learning one threshold function with approximate differential privacy exceeds the VC dimension, but only in the case of proper learning. Thus it remains possible that improper learning with approximate differential privacy can match the sample complexity of non-private learning. While we do not address this question directly, we exhibit a separation for multi-learning. In particular, learning k thresholds with approximate differential privacy requiresΩ(k 1/3 ) samples, even improperly, while O(1) samples suffices non-privately.
Related work
Differential privacy was defined in [14] and the relaxation to approximate differential privacy is from [13] . Most related to our work is the work on private learning and its sample complexity [7, 22, 12, 15, 2, 4, 5, 18, 6, 10] and the early work on sanitization [8] . That many "natural" learning tasks can be performed privately was shown in the early work of Blum et al. [7] and Kasiviswanathan et al. [22] . A characterization for the sample complexity of pure-private learners was given in [4] , in terms of a new combinatorial measure -the Representation Dimension, that is, given a class C, the number of samples needed and sufficient for privately learning C is Θ(RepDim(C)). Building on [4] , Feldman and Xiao [18] showed an equivalence between the representation dimension of a concept C and the randomized one-way communication complexity of the evaluation problem for concepts from C. Using this equivalence they separated the sample complexity of pure-private learners from that of non-private ones.
The problem of learning multiple concepts simultaneously (without privacy) has been considered before. Motivated by the problem of bridging computational learning and reasoning, Valiant [29] also observed that (without privacy) multiple concepts can be learned from a common dataset in a data efficient manner.
PRELIMINARIES
We recall and extend standard definitions from learning theory and differential privacy. See the full version of this work for a more detailed account.
Multi-learners
In the following X is some arbitrary domain. A concept (similarly, hypothesis) over domain X is a predicate defined over X. A concept class (similarly, hypothesis class) is a set of concepts. A k-labeled database over a domain X is a database S ∈ (X × {0, 1} k ) * . That is, S contains |S| elements from X, each concatenated with k binary labels.
Let A : X × {0, 1} k n → 2 X k be an algorithm that operates on a k-labeled database and returns k hypotheses. Let C be a concept class over a domain X and let H be a hypothesis class over X.
Definition 2.1 (PAC Multi-Learner). Algorithm A is an (α, β)-PAC k-learner for concept class C using hypothesis class H with sample complexity n if for every distribution D over X and for every fixture of (c1, . . . , c k ) from C,
The probability is taken over the random choice of the examples in S according to D and the coin tosses of the learner A. If H ⊆ C then A is called a proper learner; otherwise, it is called an improper learner.
An analogous definition for the agnostic setting is given in the full version of this work.
Without privacy considerations, the sample complexities of PAC and agnostic learning are essentially characterized by a combinatorial quantity called the Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension. Similarly, the sample complexity of nonprivate multi-learners is characterized by the VC dimension: We define a few specific concept classes which will play an important role in this work.
POINTX : Let X be any domain. The class of point functions is the set of all concepts that evaluate to 1 on exactly one element of
THRESHX : Let X be any totally ordered domain. The class of threshold functions takes the form THRESHX = {cx :
The VC-dimension of THRESHX is 1 for any X.
The class of parity functions on X is given by
We focus our study of the concept class PAR d on the problem of learning parities under the uniform distribution. The PAC and agnostic learning problems are defined as before, except we only require a learner to be accurate when the marginal distribution on examples is the uniform distribution U d over {0, 1} d . See the full version of this work for the formal definitions.
Differential privacy
Two k-labeled databases S, S ∈ (X × {0, 1} k ) n are called neighboring if they differ on a single (multi-labeled) entry, i.e., |{i : (xi, y1,i, . . . , y k,i ) = (x i , y 1,i , . . . , y k,i )}| = 1. [14] ). Let A : X × {0, 1} k n → 2 X k be an algorithm that operates on a k-labeled database and returns k hypotheses. Let , δ ≥ 0. Algorithm A is ( , δ)-differentially private if for all neighboring S, S and for all T ⊆ 2 X k ,
Definition 2.3 (Differential Privacy
where the probability is taken over the coin tosses of the algorithm A. When δ = 0 we say that A satisfies pure differential privacy, otherwise (i.e., if δ > 0) we say that A satisfies approximate differential privacy.
Our algorithms use various tools from the differential privacy literature, detailed in the full version of this work.
Private learners and multi-learners
Generalizing on private learners [22] , we say that an algorithm A is (α, β, , δ)-private PAC k-learner for C using H if A is (α, β)-PAC k-learner for C using H, and A is ( , δ)-differentially private (similarly with agnostic private PAC k-learners). We omit the parameter k when k = 1 and the parameter δ when δ = 0. For the case k = 1, we have a generic construction with sample complexity proportional to log |C|: 22] ). Let C be a concept class, and let α, β, > 0. There exists an (α, β, )-private agnostic proper learner for C with sample complexity
In terms of sample complexity, it is known that private learning (for the case k = 1) is an easier task than data sanitization, and several reductions from private learning to data sanitization were given in [19, 5, 6] . For example Beimel, et al. [6] gave a generic transformation from data sanitization to private learning, which generally gives improved sample complexity upper bounds.
A number of works [3, 4, 5, 18, 10] have established sharper upper and lower bounds for learning the specific concept classes POINTX and THRESHX . In the case of pure differential privacy, POINTX requires Θ(log |X|) samples to learn properly [3] , but can be learned improperly with O(1) samples. On the other hand, the class of threshold functions THRESHX require Ω(log |X|) samples to learn, even improperly [18] . In the case of approximate differential privacy, POINTX and THRESHX can be learned properly with sample complexities O(1) [5] andÕ(2 log * |X| ) [10] , respectively. Moreover, properly learning threshold functions requires sample complexity Ω(log * |X|).
Private PAC learning vs. Empirical Learning
An empirical k-learner is defined similarly to a PAC learner, except its accuracy is measured with respect to a fixed database rather than a distribution on examples. See the full version of this work for a precise definition. When an (agnostic) empirical k-learner A for a concept class C is run on a random sample of size Ω(VC(C)), it is also a (agnostic) PAC k-learner. In particular, if an empirical k-learner A is differentially private, then it also serves as a differentially private (agnostic) PAC k-learner.
Generalizing a result of [10] , the next theorem shows that the converse is true as well: a differentially private (agnostic) PAC k-learner yields a private empirical k-learner with only a constant factor increase in the sample complexity. As a consequence, the lower bounds for empirical learning that we present in Sections 4 and 5 apply to PAC learning as well.
Theorem 2.5. Let ≤ 1. Suppose A is an (agnostic) (α, β, , δ)-PAC k-learner for a concept class C with sample complexity n. Then there is an ( , δ)-differentially private (α, β)-accurate (agnostic) empirical k-learnerÃ for C with sample complexity m = 9n. Moreover, if A is proper, then so is the resulting empirical learnerÃ.
Fingerprinting Codes
An (n, k)-fingerprinting code consists of a pair of randomized algorithms (Gen, Trace). The parameter n is the number of users supported by the fingerprinting code, and k is the length of the code. The codebook generator Gen produces a codebook W ∈ {0, 1} n×k . Each row wi ∈ {0, 1} k of W is the codeword of user i. For a subset T ⊆ [n], we let WT denote the set {wi : i ∈ T } of codewords belonging to users in T . The accusation algorithm Trace takes as input a pirate codeword w and accuses some i ∈ [n] (or ⊥ if it fails to accuse any user).
We define the feasible set of pirate codewords for a coalition T and codebook W by
The basic marking assumption is that the pirate codeword w ∈ F (WT ). We say column j is b-marked if wij = b for every i ∈ [n].
Definition 2.6 (Fingerprinting Codes). For n, k ∈ N and ξ ∈ (0, 1], a pair of algorithms (Gen, Trace) is an (n, k)-fingerprinting code with security ξ if Gen outputs a codebook W ∈ {0, 1} n×k and for every (possibly randomized) adversary AF P , and every coalition T ⊆ [n], if we take w ←R AF P (WT ), then the following properties hold.
Each probability is taken over the coins of Gen, Trace, and AF P . The algorithms Gen and Trace may share a common state, which is hidden to ease notation.
UPPER BOUNDS ON THE SAMPLE COM-PLEXITY OF PRIVATE MULTI-LEARNERS

Generic Construction
In this section we present the following general upper bounds on the sample complexity of private k-learners.
Theorem 3.1. Let C be a finite concept class, and let k ≥ 1. There exists a proper agnostic (α, β, )-private PAC k-learner for C with sample complexity and there exists a proper agnostic (α, β, , δ)-private PAC k-learner for C with sample complexity
The straightforward approach for constructing a private k-learner for a class C is to separately apply a (standard) private learner for C for each of the k target concepts. Using composition theorems to argue the overall privacy guarantee of the resulting learner, we get the following observation.
Observation 3.2. Let C be a concept class and let k ≥ 1. If there is an (α, β, , δ)-PAC learner for C with sample complexity n, then
• There is an (α, kβ, k , kδ)-PAC k-learner for C with sample complexity n.
Moreover, if the initial learner is proper and/or agnostic, then so is the resulting learner.
In cases where sample efficient private PAC learners exist, it might be useful to apply Observation 3.2 in order to obtain a private k-learner. For example, Beimel et al. [3, 4] gave an improper agnostic (α, β, )-PAC learner for POINTX with sample complexity Oα( 1 log 1 β ). Using Observation 3.2 yields the following example. As we will see in Section 5, the bounds of examples 3.3 and 3.5 on the sample complexity of k-learning POINTX and PAR d are tight (up to logarithmic factors). That is, with pure-differential privacy, the direct sum gives (roughly) optimal bounds for improperly learning POINTX , and for (properly or improperly) learning PAR d . This is not the case for learning THRESHX or for properly learning learning POINTX .
In order to avoid the factor k log |C| (or √ k log |C|) in Corollary 3.4, we now show how an idea used in [6] (in the context of semi-supervised learning) can be used to construct sample efficient private k-learners. In particular, this construction will achieve tight bounds for learning THRESHX and for properly learning learning POINTX under pure-differential privacy.
Fix a concept class C, target concepts c1, . . . , c k ∈ C, and a k-labeled database S (we use D to denote the unlabeled portion of S). For every 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the goal is to identify a hypothesis hj ∈ C with low errorD(cj, hj) (such a hypothesis also has good generalization). Beimel et al. [6] observed that given a sanitizationD of D w.r.t. C ⊕ = {f ⊕g : f, g ∈ C}, for every f, g ∈ C it holds that
Hence, a hypothesis h with low errorD(h, cj) also has low errorD(h, cj) and vice versa. Let H be the set of all dichotomies overD realized by C. Note that ∃f * j ∈ H that agrees with cj onD, i.e., ∃f * j ∈ H s.t. errorD(f * j , cj) = 0, and hence errorD(f * j , cj) is also low. The thing that works in our favor here is that H is small -at most 2 |D| ≤ 2 VC(C) -and hence choosing a hypothesis out of H is easy. Therefore, for every j we can use the exponential mechanism to identify a hypothesis hj ∈ H with low errorD(hj, cj). 
Lemma 3.6 follows from the following lemma. 
Moreover, it is both ( + k , δ) and ( + 2k ln(1/δ) + 2k 2 , 2δ)-differentially private.
Using Lemma 3.7 with the generic sanitizer of [8] or [20] results in Lemma 3.6.
Proof of Lemma 3.7. The proof is via the construction of GenericLearner (algorithm 1). Note that GenericLearner only accesses S via a sanitizer (on Step 2) and using the exponential mechanism (on Step 5). Composition theorems guarantee that GenericLearner is both ( +k , δ)-differentially private and ( + 2k ln(1/δ) + 2k 2 , 2δ)-differentially private. We, thus, only need to prove that with high probability the learner returns α-good hypotheses.
Fix a distribution P over X × {0, 1} k , and let Pj denote the marginal distribution of P on the examples and the j th label. Let S consist of examples (xi, yi,1, . . . , y i,k ) ∼ P. We use D = (xi) n i=1 to denote the unlabeled portion of S, and use S|j = ((xi, yj,i)) n i=1 to denote a database containing the examples in S together with their j th label. Define the following three events:
Algorithm 1 GenericLearner Input: Concept class C, privacy parameters , , δ, and a k-labeled database S = (xi, yi,1, . . . , y i,k ) n i=1 . We use D = (xi) n i=1 to denote the unlabeled portion of S. Used Algorithm: An ( α 5 , β 5 )-accurate ( , δ)-private sanitizer for C ⊕ with sample complexity m. E1 : For every f, h ∈ C it holds that
. E3 : For every 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the hypothesis hj chosen by the exponential mechanism is such that error S| j (hj) ≤ α 5 + min f ∈H error S| j (f ) . We first argue that when these three events happen algorithm GenericLearner returns good hypotheses. Fix 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and let c * j = argmin f ∈C {errorP j (f )}. We denote ∆ = errorP j (c * j ). We need to show that if E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3 occurs, then the hypothesis hj returned by GenericLearner is s.t. errorP j (hj) ≤ α + ∆.
For every (y1, . . . , y |B| ) ∈ ΠC (B), algorithm GenericLearner adds to H a hypothesis f s.t. ∀1 ≤ ≤ |B|, f (b ) = y . In particular, H contains a hypothesis h * j s.t. h * j (x) = c * j (x) for every x ∈ B, that is, a hypothesis h * j s.t. error D (h * j , c * j ) = 0. As event E1 has occurred we have that this h * j satisfies errorD(h * j , c * j ) ≤ 2α 5 . Using the triangle inequality (and event E2) we get that this h * j satisfies error
Thus, event E3 ensures that algorithm GenericLearner chooses (using the exponential mechanism) a hypothesis hj ∈ H s.t. error S| j (hj) ≤ 4α 5 + ∆. Event E2 ensures, therefore, that this hj satisfies errorP j (hj) ≤ α+∆. We will now show E1∩E2∩E3 happens with high probability.
Standard arguments in learning theory state that (w.h.p.) the empirical error on a (large enough) random sample is close to the generalization error. Specifically, by setting n ≥ O( 1 α 2 VC(C) log( k αβ )), generalization for agnostic learning ensures that Event E2 occurs with probability at least (1 − 2 5 β).
Assuming that n ≥ m (the sample complexity of the sanitizer used in Step 5), with probability at least (1 − β 5 ) for every (h ⊕ f ) ∈ C ⊕ (i.e., for every h, f ∈ C) it holds that
Event E1 occurs therefore with probability at least (1 − β 5 ). The exponential mechanism ensures that the probability of event E3 is at least 1 − k|H| · exp(− αm/10). Note that
, ensures that the probability of GenericLearner failing is at most β. 
Upper Bounds for Approximate Private Multi-Learners
In this section we give two examples of cases where the sample complexity of private k-learning is of the same order as that of non-private k-learning (the sample complexity does not depend on k). Recall that (even without privacy constraints) the sample complexity of PAC learning PAR d under the uniform distribution is Ω(d). Hence the sample complexity of privately k-learning PAR d (non-agnostically) under the uniform distribution is of the same order as that of non-private k-learning.
For the intuition behind Theorem 3.8, let c1, . . . , c k denote the k target concepts, and consider the quality function q(D, (h1, . . . , h k )) = max 1≤j≤k {errorD(hj, cj)}. On a large enough sample D we expect that q(D, (h1, . . . , h k )) ≈ 1 2 for every (h1, . . . , h k ) = (c1, . . . , c k ), while q(D, (c1, . . . , c k )) = 0. The k target concepts can hence be privately identified (exactly) using stability techniques.
In order to make our algorithm computationally efficient, we apply the "subsample and aggregate" idea of Nissim et al. [23] . We divide the input sample into a small number of subsamples, use Gaussian elimination to (non-privately) identify a candidate hypothesis vector on each subsample, and then select from these candidates privately.
Proof of Theorem 3.8. The proof is via the construction of P arityLearner (algorithm 2). First note that changing a single input element in S can change (at most) one element of Y . Hence, applying (the ( , δ)-private) algorithm A dist on Y preserves privacy (applying P arityLearner on neighboring inputs amounts to executing A dist on neighboring inputs).
Algorithm 2 P arityLearner
Input: Parameters , δ, and a k-labeled database S of size n = O( d log( 1 βδ )). Output: Hypotheses h1, . . . , h k .
1. Split S into m = O( 1 log( 1 βδ )) disjoint samples S1, . . . , Sm of size O(d) each. Initiate Y as the empty multiset.
For every 1 ≤ t ≤ m:
(a) For every 1 ≤ j ≤ k try to use Gaussian elimination to identify a parity function yj that agrees with the labels of the j th column of St.
3. Use algorithm A dist with privacy parameters , δ to choose and return a vector of k parity functions (h1, . . . , h k ) ∈ (PAR d ) k with a large number of appearances in Y . Now fix k target concepts c1, . . . , c k ∈ PAR d and let S be a random k-labeled database containing n i.i.d. elements from the uniform distribution U d over X = {0, 1} d , each labeled by c1, . . . , c k . Observe that (for every 1 ≤ t ≤ m) we have that St contains i.i.d. elements from U d labeled by c1, . . . , c k . We use Dt to denote the unlabeled portion of St. Standard arguments in learning theory state that for |St| ≥ O(d), So, for every 1 ≤ t ≤ m, with probability 7/8 we have that for every label column j the only hypothesis with empirical error less than 1 40 on St is the j th target concept itself (with empirical error 0). In such a case, step 2a (Gaussian elimination) identifies exactly the vector of k target concepts (c1, . . . , c k ). Since m ≥ O(log( 1 β )), the Chernoff bound ensures that except with probability β/2, the vector (c1, . . . , c k ) is identified in at least 3/4 of the iterations of step 2. Assuming that this is the case, the vector (c1, . . . , c k ) appears in Y at least 3m/4 times, while every other vector can appear at most m/4 times. Provided that m ≥ O( 1 log( 1 βδ )), algorithm A dist ensures that the k target concepts are chosen with probability 1 − β/2.
All in all, algorithm P arityLearner identifies the k target concepts (exactly) with probability 1 − β, provided that n ≥ O( d log( 1 βδ )).
We next show that the class of POINTX can be (nonagnostically) k-learned using constant sample complexity, matching the non-private sample complexity. Theorem 3.9. For every domain X and every k ∈ N there exists an (α, β, , δ)-PAC (non-agnostic) k-learner for POINTX with sample complexity O( 1 α log( 1 αβδ )).
The proof is via the construction of Algorithm 3. The algorithm begins by privately identifying (using sanitization) a set of O(1/α) "heavy" elements in the input database, appearing Ω(α) times. The k labels of such a heavy element can be privately identified using stability arguments (since their duplicity in the database is large). The labels of a "non-heavy" element can be set to 0 since a target concept can evaluate to 1 on at most one such non-heavy element, in which case the error is small. Notation. We use #S(x) to denote the duplicity of a domain element x in a database S. For a distribution µ we denote µ(x) = Prx ∼µ [x = x].
Algorithm 3 P ointLearner
Input: Privacy parameters , δ, and a k-labeled database S = (xi, yi,1, . . . , y i,k ) n i=1 . We use D = (xi) n i=1 to denote the unlabeled portion of S. Output: Hypotheses h1, . . . , h k . That is, q(S, x, (v1, . . . , v k )) = |{i : xi = x ∧ yi,1 = v1 ∧ · · · ∧ y i,k = v k }|.
Use algorithm
A dist with privacy parameters 2 , δ 2 to choose a set of vectors V = { vx ∈ {0, 1} k : x ∈ G} maximizing Q(S, V ) = min vx∈V {q(S, x, vx)}. That is, we use algorithm A dist to choose a set of |G| vectors -a vector vx for every x ∈ G -such that the minimal number of appearances of an entry (x, vx) in the database S is maximized. 5. For 1 ≤ j ≤ k: If the j th entry of every vx ∈ V is 0, then set hj ≡ 0. Otherwise, let x be s.t. vx ∈ V has 1 as its j th entry, and define hj : X → {0, 1} as hj(y) = 1 iff y = x.
6. Return h1, . . . , h k .
Proof of Theorem 3.9. The proof is via the construction of P ointLearner (algorithm 3). First note the algorithm only access the input database using sanitization on step 1, and using algorithm A dist on step 4. By composition of differential privacy, algorithm P ointLearner is ( , δ)differentially private.
Let µ be a distribution over X, and let c1, . . . , c k ∈ POINTX be the fixed target concepts. Consider the execution of P ointLearner on a database S = (xi, yi,1, . . . , y i,k ) n i=1 sampled from µ and labeled by c1, . . . , c k . We use D to denote the unlabeled portion of S,D for the sanitization of D con-structed on step 1, and write m = |D|. Define the following good events.
We now argue that when these three events happen algorithm P ointLearner returns good hypotheses. First, observe that the set G contains every element x s.t. µ(x) ≥ α: Let x be s.t. µ(x) ≥ α. As event E1 has occurred, we have that 1 n #S(x) ≥ α/10. As event E2 has occurred, we have that 1 m #D(x) ≥ α/15, and therefore x ∈ G. Note that if q(S, x, v) ≥ 1 then the example x is labeled as v by the target concepts. Thus, as event E3 has occurred, for every vx ∈ V it holds that vx = (c1(x), . . . , c k (x)). Now let hj be the j th returned hypothesis. We next show that hj is α-good. If hj ≡ 0, then let x be the unique element s.t.
hj(x) = 1, and note that (according to step 5) the j th entry of vx is 1, and hence, cj(x) = 1. So hj = cj (since cj is a concept in POINTX ).
If hj ≡ 0 then the j th entry of every vx ∈ V is 0. Note that in such a case hj only errs on the unique element x s.t. cj(x) = 1, and it suffices to show that µ(x) < α. Assume towards contradiction that µ(x) ≥ α. As before, event E1 ∩ E2 implies that x ∈ G. As event E3 has occurred, we also have that vx ∈ V is s.t. q(S, x, vx) ≥ 1, and the example x is labeled as vx by the target concepts. This contradicts the assumption that the j th entry of vx ∈ V is 0.
Thus, whenever E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3 happens, algorithm P ointLearner returns α-good hypotheses. We will now show E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3 happens with high probability. Provided n ≥ O( 1 α log( 1 αδ )), event E2 is guaranteed to hold with all but probability β/4 by the utility properties of the sanitizer used on step 1.
Generalization bounds ensure that event E1 holds with probability 1 − β/4, provided that n ≥ O( 1 α log( 1 αβ )). To see this, let z ≡ 0 denote the constant 0 hypothesis, and consider the class C = POINTX ∪{z}. Note that VC(C) = 1. Hence, with all but probability 1−β/4, for every c ∈ POINTx s.t. errorµ(c, z) ≥ α it holds that errorD(c, z) ≥ α/10. That is, with all but probability 1 − β/4, for every x ∈ X s.t. µ(x) ≥ α it holds that 1 n #D(x) = 1 n #S(x) ≥ α/10. Before analyzing event E3, we show that if E2 occurs,
Assuming event E2 has occurred, we therefore have that 1 n #S(x) ≥ α/30. So every x ∈ G appears in S at least αn/30 times with the labels (c1(x), . . . , c k (x)) c(x). Thus, q(S, x, c(x)) ≥ αn/30. In addition, for every v = c(x) it holds that q(S, x, v) = 0, since every appearance of the example x is labeled by the target concepts. Hence, provided that n ≥ O( 1 α log( 1 βδ )), algorithm A dist ensures that event E3 happens with probability at least 1 − β/2.
Overall, E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3 happens with probability at least 1 − β.
APPROX. PRIVACY LOWER BOUNDS FROM FINGERPRINTING CODES
In this section, we show how fingerprinting codes can be used to obtain poly(k) lower bounds against privately learning k concepts, even for very simple concept classes. Fingerprinting codes were introduced by Boneh and Shaw [9] to address the problem of watermarking digital content. The connection between fingerprinting codes and differential privacy lower bounds was established by Bun, Ullman, and Vadhan [11] in the context of private query release, and has since been extended to a number of other differentially private analyses [1, 16, 26, 10] .
A (fully-collusion-resistant) fingerprinting code is a scheme for distributing codewords w1, . . . , wn to n users that can be uniquely traced back to each user. Moreover, if any group of users combines its codewords into a pirate codeword w , then the pirate codeword can still be traced back to one of the users who contributed to it. Of course, without any assumption on how the pirates can produce their combined codeword, no secure tracing is possible. To this end, the pirates are constrained according to a marking assumption, which asserts that the combined codeword must agree with at least one of the pirates' codeword in each position. Namely, at an index j where wij = b for every pirate i, the pirates are constrained to output w with w j = b as well.
To illustrate our technique, we start with an informal discussion of how the original Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting code yields anΩ(k 1/3 ) sample complexity lower bound for multilearning threshold functions. For parameters n and k, the (n, k)-Boneh-Shaw codebook is a matrix W ∈ {0, 1} n×k , whose rows wi are the codewords given to users i = 1, . . . , n. The codebook is built from a number of highly structured columns, where a "column of type i" consists of n bits where the first i bits are set to 1 and the last n − i bits are set to 0. For i = 1, . . . , n − 1, each column of type i is repeated a total of k/(n − 1) times, and the codebook W is obtained as a random permutation of these k columns. The security of the Boneh-Shaw code is a consequence of the secrecy of this random permutation. If a coalition of pirates is missing the codeword of user i, then it is unable to distinguish columns of type i − 1 from columns of type i. Hence, if a pirate codeword is too consistent with a user i's codeword in both the columns of type i − 1 and the columns of type i, a tracing algorithm can reasonably conclude that user i contributed to it. Boneh and Shaw showed that such a code is indeed secure for k =Õ(n 3 ).
To see how this fingerprinting code gives a lower bound for multi-learning thresholds, consider thresholds over the data universe X = {1, . . . , |X|} for |X| ≥ n. The key observation is that each column of the Boneh-Shaw codebook can be obtained as a labeling of the examples 1, . . . , n by a threshold concept. Namely, a column of type i is the labeling of 1, . . . , n by the concept ci. Now suppose a coalition of users T ⊆ [n] constructs a database S where each row is an example i ∈ T together with the labels wi1, . . . , w ik coming from the codeword given to user i. Let (h1, . . . , h k ) be the hypotheses produced by running a threshold multi-learner on the database. If every user has a bit b at index j of her codeword, then the hypothesis produced by the learner must also evaluate to b on most of the examples. Thus, the empirical averages of the hypotheses (h1, . . . , h k ) on the examples can be used to obtain a pirate codeword satisfying the mark-ing assumption. The security of the fingerprinting code, i.e. the fact that this codeword can be traced back to a user i ∈ T , implies that the learner cannot be differentially private. Hence, n samples is insufficient for privately learning k =Õ(n 3 ) threshold concepts, giving a sample complexity lower bound ofΩ(k 1/3 ).
The lower bounds in this section are stated for empirical learning, but extend to PAC learning by Theorem 2.5. We also remark that they hold against the relaxed privacy notion of label privacy, where differential privacy only needs to hold with respect to changing the labels of one example.
Lower Bound for Improper PAC Learning
Our lower bounds for multi-learning follow from constructions of fingerprinting codes with additional structural properties.
Definition 4.1. Let C be a concept class over a domain X. An (n, k)-fingerprinting code (Gen, Trace) is compatible with concept class C if there exist x1, . . . , xn ∈ X such that for every codebook W in the support of Gen, there exist concepts c1, . . . , c k such that wij = cj(xi) for every i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , k. The proof of Theorem 4.2 follows the ideas sketched above.
Proof. Let (Gen, Trace) be an (n, k)-fingerprinting code compatible with the concept class C, and let x1, . . . , xn ∈ X be its associated universe elements. Let D = (x1, . . . , xn) and let A be an (α, β)-accurate empirical k-learner for C with sample complexity n. We will use A to design an adversary AF P against the fingerprinting code.
Let T ⊆ [n] be a coalition of users, and consider a codebook W ←R Gen. The adversary strategy AF P (WT ) begins by constructing a labeled database S = (Si) n i=1 by setting Si = (xi, wi1, . . . , w ik ) for each i ∈ T and to a nonce row for i / ∈ T . It then runs A(S) obtaining hypotheses (h1, . . . , h k ). Finally, it computes for each j = 1, . . . , k the averages
hj(xi) and produces a pirate word w by setting each w j to the value of aj rounded to 0 or 1. Now consider the coalition T = [n]. Since the fingerprinting code is compatible with C, each column (w1j, . . . , wnj) = (cj(x1), . . . , cj(xn)) for some concept cj ∈ C. Thus, if the hypotheses (h1, . . . , h k ) are α-accurate for (c1, . . . , c k ) on S, then w ∈ F (WT ) = F (W ). Therefore, by the completeness property of the code and the (α, β)-accuracy of A, we have Pr [Trace(AF P (W )) = ⊥] ≥ 1 − ξ − β.
In particular, there exists an i * for which
On the other hand, by the soundness property of the code, Pr [Trace(AF P (W−i * )) = i * ] ≤ ξ.
Thus, A cannot be ( , δ)-differentially private whenever
Remark 4.3. If we additionally assume that there exists an element x0 ∈ X with c1(x0) = c2(x0) = · · · = c k (x0), then we can use a "padding" argument to obtain a stronger lower bound of n/3α. More specifically, suppose c1(x0) = · · · = c k (x0) = 0. We pad the database S constructed above with (1/3α − 1)n copies of the junk row (x0, 0, . . . , 0). Now if a hypothesis h is α-accurate for a 0-marked column, it's empirical average will be at most α. On the other hand, an α-accurate hypothesis for a 1-marked column will have empirical average at least 2α. Since there is a gap between these two quantities, a pirate algorithm can still turn an accurate vector of k hypotheses into a feasible codeword.
As observed earlier, the (n, k)-Boneh-Shaw code is compatible with the concept class THRESHX for any |X| ≥ n. Thus, instantiating Theorem 4.2 (and Remark 4.3) with the Boneh-Shaw code yields a lower bound for k-learning thresholds.
Lemma 4.4 ([9] ). Let X be a totally ordered domain with |X| ≥ n for some n ∈ N. Then there exists an (n, k)fingerprinting code compatible with the concept class THRESHX with security ξ as long as k ≥ 2n 3 log(2n/ξ). 
Discussion.
Compatibility with a concept class is an interesting measure of the complexity of a fingerprinting code which warrants further attention. Peikert, shelat, and Smith [24] showed that structural constraints (related to compatibility) on a fingerprinting code give a lower bound on its length beyond the general lower bound of k =Ω(n 2 ) for arbitrary fingerprinting codes. In particular, they showed that the length k =Õ(n 3 ) of the Boneh-Shaw code is essentially tight for the "multiplicity paradigm", where a codebook is a random permutation of a fixed set of columns, each repeated the same number of times. We take this as evidence that our Ω(k 1/3 ) lower bound for THRESHX cannot be improved via compatible fingerprinting codes. However, closing the gap between our lower bound and the upper bound of roughly √ k remains an intriguing open question. A natural avenue for obtaining stronger poly(k) lower bounds for private k-learning is to identify compatible fingerprinting codes with shorter length. Tardos [27] showed the existence of an (n, k)-fingerprinting code of optimal length k =Õ(n 2 ) (see Proposition 4.8) . The construction of his code differs significantly from multiplicity paradigm: for each column j of the Tardos code, a bias pj ∈ (0, 1) is sampled from a fixed distribution, and then each bit of the column is sampled i.i.d. with bias pj. Hence, the columns of the Tardos code are supported on all bit vectors in {0, 1} n . This means that for a concept class C to be compatible with the (n, k)-Tardos code, it must be the case that VC(C) ≥ n. Thus, the lower bound one obtains against k-learning C only matches the lower bound for PAC learning C (without privacy). It would be very interesting to construct a fingerprinting code of optimal length k =Õ(n 2 ) with substantially fewer than 2 n column types (and hence compatible with a concept class of VC-dimension smaller than n).
Lower Bound for Agnostic Learning
In the agnostic learning model, a learner has to perform well even when the columns of a multi-labeled database do not correspond to any concept. This allows us to apply the argument of Theorem 4.2 without the constraint of compatibility. The result is that any fingerprinting code, in particular one with optimal length, gives an agnostic learning lower bound for any non-trivial concept class. Proof. The proof follows in much the same way as that of Theorem 4.2. Let (Gen, Trace) be an (n, k)-fingerprinting code, and let x ∈ X be such that there exist c0, c1 ∈ C with c0(x) = 0 and c1(x) = 1. Let A be an agnostic (α, β)accurate empirical k-learner for C with sample complexity n. Define the fingerprinting code adversary AF P just as in Theorem 4.2. Namely, AF P constructs examples of the form (x, wi1, . . . , w ik ) with the available rows of the fingerprinting code, runs A on the result, and returns the rounded empirical averages of the k resulting hypotheses.
To show that A cannot be ( , δ)-differentially private, it suffices to show that if A produces accurate hypotheses h1, . . . , h k , then the pirate codeword produced by AF P is feasible. To see this, suppose h1, . . . , h k are accurate, i.e. max 1≤j≤k error S| j (hj) − min c∈C error S| j (c) ≤ α.
Let column j of the codebook W be 0-marked, i.e. wij = 0 for all i ∈ [n]. Recall that c0(x) = 0, and hence error S| j (c0) = 0. Therefore, since hypothesis hj is α-accurate, we have error S| j (hj) ≤ α. This implies that bit w j of the pirate codeword is 0. An identical argument shows that the bits of the pirate codeword in the 1-marked columns are also 1. Thus, if A produces accurate hypotheses, the pirate codeword produced by AF P is feasible. The rest of the argument in the proof of Theorem 4.2 completes the proof. Proof sketch. By Lemma 2.5, it is enough to rule out a private empirical learner for a database whose n examples are the distinct binary strings in {0, 1} d . To do so, we follow the proof of Theorem 4.6, highlighting the changes that need to be made. First, we let c0 be the all-zeroes concept, and let c1 be an arbitrary other parity function. Second, AF P instead constructs examples of the form (xi, wi1, . . . , w ik ) where xi is the ith binary string. Finally, when converting the hypotheses (h1, . . . , h k ) into a feasible codeword, we instead set w j to 0 if hj(D) ≤ α, and set w j to 1 if hj(D) ≥ 1 2 − α. This works because, while error S| j (c0) = 0 with respect to 0-marked columns, any concept (and in particular, c1) has error 1 2 with respect to 1-marked columns.
EXAMPLES WHERE DIRECT SUM IS OPTIMAL
In this section we show several examples for cases where the direct sum is (roughly) optimal. As we saw in Section 4, with ( , δ)-differential privacy, every non-trivial agnostic klearner requires sample complexity Ω( √ k). We can prove a similar result for -private learners, that holds even for non-agnostic learners:
Theorem 5.1. Let C be any non-trivial concept class over a domain X (i.e., |C| ≥ 2). Every proper or improper (α, β= 1 2 , )-private PAC k-learner for C requires sample complexity Ω(k/ ).
In [3, 4, 5] , Beimel et al. presented an agnostic proper learner for POINTX with sample complexity O α,β, ,δ (1) under ( , δ)-privacy, and an agnostic improper learner for POINTX with sample complexity O α,β, (1) under -privacy. Hence, using Observation 3.2 (direct sum) with their results yields an (α, β, , δ)-PAC agnostic proper k-learner for POINTX with sample complexityÕ α,β, ,δ ( √ k), and an (α, β, )-PAC agnostic improper k-learner for POINTX with sample complex-ityÕ α,β, (k). As supported by our lower bounds (Corollary 4.9 and Theorem 5.1), those learners have roughly optimal sample complexity (ignoring the dependency in α, β, , δ and logarithmic factors in k).
h(x)). Therefore, by the utility properties of A, for every c = (c1, . . . , c k ) ∈ {f, g} k we have that PrA[A(S c ) = (c1, . . . , c k )] ≥ 1 2 . By changing the database S c to S c one row at a time while applying the differential privacy constraint, we see that Pr A [A(S c ) = (c 1 , . . . , c k )] ≥ 1 2 e − n .
Since the above inequality holds for every two databases S c and S c , we get
Solving for n, this yields n = Ω(k/ ).
Remark 5.2. The above proof could easily be strengthened to show that n = Ω( k α ), provided that C contains two concepts f, g s.t. ∃x, y ∈ X for which f (x) = g(x) and f (y) = g(y).
The following lemma shows that the sample complexities of properly and improperly learning parities under the uniform distribution are the same. Thus, for showing lower bounds, it is without loss of generality to consider proper learners. Hence, errorU d (h j , cj) < 1/2. Since the error of any parity function from cj (other than cj itself) is exactly 1/2 under the uniform distribution, we conclude that (h 1 , . . . , h k ) is in fact 0-accurate for (c1, . . . , c k ).
Theorem 5.4. Let α < 1 4 . Every (α, β= 1 2 , )-PAC klearner for PAR d (under the uniform distribution) requires sample complexity Ω(kd/ ).
As we saw in Example 3.5, applying direct sum for klearning parities results in a proper agnostic (α, β, )-PAC klearner for PAR d with sample complexity O α,β, (kd+k log k). As stated by Theorem 5.4, this is the best possible (ignoring logarithmic factors and the dependency in α, β, ).
Proof of Theorem 5.4. The proof is based on a packing argument [21, 3] . Let A be an (α, β, )-PAC k-learner for PAR d with sample complexity n. By Lemma 5.3, we may assume A is proper and learns the hidden concepts exactly.
For every choice of k parity functions (c1, . . . , c k ) = c ∈ (PAR d ) k , let S c denote a random k-labeled database containing n i.i.d. elements from U d , each labeled by (c1, . . . , c k ). By the utility properties of A we have that PrU d ,A[A(S c ) = c] ≥ 1 2 . In particular, for every c ∈ (PAR d ) k there exists a database D c labeled by c s.t. PrA[A(S c ) = c] ≥ 1 2 . By changing the database D c to D c one row at a time while applying the differential privacy constraint, we see that
Since the above inequality holds for every two databases D c and D c , we get
Solving for n, this yields n = Ω(kd/ ).
